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The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum
Carl Tobias·
I. INTRODUCTION

Selection of federal appellate court judges is now extremely controversial.
Slowed nominee processing, accusations and countercharges between
Democrats and Republicans, as well as "paybacks," have characterized
appointments since 1990. One tenth of the 179 active circuit judgeships
authorized by the United States Congress are perennially vacant, and
substantial numbers of these positions can remain open for years. Individual
tribunals have encountered even more aggravated conditions. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits operated
without a third of their judicial complements at different junctures throughout
this period, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
functioned absent half its members over eight recent months. Indeed, one new
Fourth Circuit seat approved by lawmakers went unfilled more than a decade.
Specific nominees often received tardy-and on occasion no---consideration
from the United States Senate, which exercises advice and consent powers. For
instance, the elevation of Federal District Judge Richard Paez to the Ninth
Circuit required four years. Michigan Court of Appeals Judge Helene White
also waited longer than anyone in national history for a hearing that she was
never granted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has principal
responsibility for confirmation. Moreover, when the 107th Congress adjourned
in December 2002, the Judiciary panel had not accorded hearings to a few
nominees whom President George W. Bush had submitted nineteen months
earlier, while the Senate needed four years to confirm Judges Priscilla Owen
and Terrence Boyle. The Committee increasingly votes along straight political
party lines, and Democratic senators even relied on filibusters to deny
nominees positions on the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit as well as the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.
The existence of numerous, protracted vacancies, therefore, has
detrimentally affected the whole appointments process, appellate courts and
judges, entities and individuals working on selection, and attorneys and parties
who take appeals to the regional circuits. For example, lengthy openings have
postponed case resolution and frustrated the goal of inexpensive and equitable
appellate disposition, while vacancies forced the Sixth and Ninth Circuits to
cancel oral arguments, imposing unnecessary expenditures and delay. The
*Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Chris
Bryant, Briant Platt, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions; Judy Canter and Pam Smith for
processing this piece; as well as Beckley Singleton, James E. Rogers, and Russell Williams for
their generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine alone.
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complication's persistence appears to have undermined respect for all three
federal government branches, most significantly the institutions of the
presidency and the Senate, but even the judiciary.
These propositions mean that federal appeals court appointments merit
scrutiny, which this Article undertakes. The initial Section discusses the
reasons why many circuit judgeships have lacked occupants for extensive
periods and finds that several phenomena have contributed to the appellate
court dilemma. An important factor is that the regional circuits are the courts
of last resort for their geographic areas, in particular when treating modern
policy issues such as abortion and federalism, because the Supreme Court
hears so few appeals. Similarly cogent is the prevalence of divided
government: until recently, during the past two decades, one political party has
controlled the Executive Branch and the other the upper chamber. I find
Democratic and Grand Old Party ("GOP") presidents and senators have almost
identical responsibilities for the conundrum. They assumed remarkably
analogous stances when each occupied the White House and possessed a
Senate majority, while either could have improved the circumstances by
exercising the requisite political will.
Part II evaluates appellate court selection since January 2002. This
analysis reveals that phenomena-which include stalled nominee
consideration, divisiveness, and partisan wrangling-that have been
manifested for more than a decade continued to pervade appointments and may
even have intensified. One trenchant illustration was the 2002 Judiciary
Committee rejection of Judges Priscilla Owen and Charles Pickering for the
Fifth Circuit, with ten Democrats voting against and nine Republicans favoring
the jurists-although the full Senate might well have confirmed them. Others
are the Bush Administration decisions to renominate both judges in 2003, after
the GOP had won the chamber, to recess appoint Judges Pickering and William
Pryor during 2004, and to renominate numerous candidates whom Democrats
had previously blocked in 2005. Equally salient is Democrats' invocation of
filibusters when they opposed those and additional nominees.
The concluding segment of the Article offers proposals for the future,
which should rectify or ameliorate the current situation. The Article ascertains,
for instance, that the Chief Executive and public officials who discharge
judicial selection responsibilities could think about submitting nominees with
rather moderate ideological perspectives if the administration intends to have
the appeals court bench operate at full strength. Senators should concomitantly
review numerous promising measures that the legislators might implement to
facilitate appointments. For example, when Senate members believe that
prospective candidates are unacceptable, the lawmakers should tender
individuals whom they deem more palatable. Another salutary technique is
consultation, whereby President Bush and those officers who help recruit
appellate judges could solicit-and senators might furnish-candid, instructive
assessments of designees the administration is considering prior to their formal
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nomination.
II.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONUNDRUM

A. Introduction

The background of the problems that have attended federal appeals court
selection may seem to warrant comparatively limited exploration in this
Article, because judicial appointments' history has received much treatment
elsewhere' and the present circumstances appear most relevant. Nonetheless,
much analysis is justified, as the evaluation should improve understanding of
the regional circuits, of obstacles that presidents and senators have encountered
when they attempted to nominate and confirm appellate court judges, and of
the existing situation detailed in the Article's next section.
The difficulty in federal appeals court selection has two primary
constituents. The first component is the persistent vacancies problem that
resulted from legislative expansion of federal courts' criminal and civil
jurisdiction and from rising appellate and district court dockets since
approximately the mid-twentieth century. These conditions promoted the
bench's growth, increasing the number and frequency of open seats and
complicating efforts to appoint judges who would fill them. The second
constituent is the current difficulty, which is in essence political and which
derives principally from control of the White House and of the Senate by
different political parties over the last two decades. I emphasize the political
aspect, as it best elucidates the major problems that have accompanied judicial
selection for the regional circuits. However, the longstanding complication
deserves some examination, and this review should foster appreciation of the
historical background that underlies the present conundrum. 2

1
See generally MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF
APPOINTING FEDERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION
OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) (addressing persistent vacancies in judicial positions) [hereinafter
MILLER REPORT]; Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem
and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REv. 319 (1994) (same). I rely substantially in this Article
on Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527
(1998).
2
The complication warrants less examination because much delay is inherent and thus
defies felicitous treatment; political factors underlie more the current problem than the persistent
dilemma, which has also been assessed elsewhere. See generally Bermant et al., supra note 1;
The Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal
Judiciary: The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REc. Ass'NBAR CITYN.Y. 374
(1987) [hereinafter Vacancy Problem]; Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock,
76 JUDICATURE 185 (1993) (explaining present need to create more judgeships by promptly
filling vacancies).
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B. The Persistent Vacancies Problem

The persistent dilemma comprises multiple strands, most of which can be
traced to the nation's origins and to Article II in the United States Constitution.
Nevertheless, I focus on the problem's contemporary dimensions, whose
primary sources have been enlarged federal court jurisdiction and burgeoning
numbers of appeals, which led Congress to authorize many new appellate and
district positions. This, in tum, expanded the number and frequency of
vacancies and increased the difficulty of confirming judges.
1. The Early History

The appointments clause in Article II states that the president "shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint" federal judges. 3 Certain founders, most prominently Alexander
Hamilton, envisioned that the upper chamber would function as a useful
safeguard against Chief Executives' potential favoritism, might help restrict
the approval of people who would be unfit for judicial service, and could lend
considerable stability to the process. 4 The Framers, accordingly, recognized
and anticipated that politics would be important, and often critical, to selection.
Senators have actively participated in federal judicial appointments since
the country was founded, because they have a large stake in affecting---or
seeming to influence-the process. Complicated political accommodations
which implicate the body and the president during the nascent phases of
selection have facilitated the system's operation. 5 Moreover, Senate members
have conventionally helped designate and confirm nominees, in particular
nominees for the federal district courts. Senators---or senior elected officials of
the Chief Executive's party-from the jurisdiction where the trial judge will sit
have ordinarily recommended candidates whom the president has then

3
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution assigns the House and the judiciary
considerably less responsibility than the president and the Senate. The term "president" includes
executive branch officials, such as lawyers in the White House Counsel Office and in the
Department of Justice. The Senate includes the Judiciary Committee, which has principal
responsibility for confirmation, and its chair; the Majority Leader; and individual senators.
4
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 76, 513 (Alexander Hamilton); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28 (2000);
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN 11-13 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal
Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 627-31 (2003); Dr. John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of
the Senate's Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 633, 646-48 (2003).
5
See HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972); GERHARDT,
supra note 4, at 29-34; Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 321. See generally Albert P. Melone, The

Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus
Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 72-73 (1991) (explaining historical role and participation of
senators).
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nominated. 6
Politics, therefore, has long penneated, and remains a strikingly
ubiquitous constituent of, federal judicial appointments. If the Chief Executive
and Senate members disagree, they can behave in a tactical manner to secure
advantage and to control how judges are chosen, even using delay
strategically. 7 For instance, Senator Spencer Abraham, a Republican from
Michigan, blocked upper chamber consideration over a several-year period of
two individuals from Michigan whom President Bill Clinton had
recommended. Democratic Senators Carl Levin and Debbie Stabenow
prevented Senate Judiciary Committee hearings across 2001 and 2002 on
Bush's four Michigan nominees. 8 Senator Jesse Helms, a Republican from
North Carolina, similarly precluded chamber assessment during the entire
Clinton Administration of quite a few nominees whom the Democratic Chief
Executive tendered for North Carolina positions on the Fourth Circuit. Senator
John Edwards, Democrat from North Carolina, analogously prevented hearings
throughout the Bush Administration's initial half-tenn for United States
District Judge Terrence Boyle, whom the president had ostensibly submitted at
the behest of Senator Helms. 9 Tension between the Chief Executive and the
Senate is destined to endure as long as the institution's advice and consent is
required for confirmation. 10
The president and senators, thus, have shared responsibility for the
selection of judges in a process that has always been politicized. However,
numerous openings, which could remain vacant over extended periods, only
became a serious complication thirty years ago. For almost two centuries after
Congress passed the 1789 Judiciary Act, the number of federal appeals and
district court judges gradually increased to 277; the rather few empty seats and
the comparative infrequency of vacancies meant that nominees received
prompt confinnation, which avoided the dilemma that later materialized. 11

6

President Dwight D. Eisenhower selected comparatively few nominees he thought would
engender opposition from home-state senators. See Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary .
. . Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 155, 156 (1959-QO); see also
MILLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (stating Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's view of
judicial selection process as Senate appointment with presidential advice and consent).
1
See CHASE, supra note 5, at 14, 40; Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 321; see also Melone,
supra note 5, at 72 (discussing historical politicization).
8
See Nedra Pickler, Bush Picks State Judge for Appeals Panel, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June
27, 2002, at Al5; Jonathan Ringel, The Battle for the 6th Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001,
at 8.
9
See Brooke A. Masters, For One Nominee, Fight Ahead, WASH. POST, May 18, 2001, at
A29; David G. Savage, Clinton Losing Fight for Black Judge, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at Al.
1
°There are apparently two principal mechanisms for addressing that constitutional
stricture. "One requires constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment." See
Bermant et al., supra note l, at 322.
11
See MILLER REPORT, supra note l, at 3; Tobias, supra note l, at 531.
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2. History Since 1950

Federal criminal and civil jurisdiction experienced significant growth
throughout the concluding third of the twentieth century .12 Congress
federalized considerable criminal behavior and prescribed many new civil
causes of action, which have correspondingly fostered a three hundred percent
annual rise in district court filings since the 1950s. 13 Senators and
representatives responded to caseload expansion by enlarging the complement
of Article III judges: lawmakers have now authorized 179 active appellate
court positions and 667 active district court positions. 14
The Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Long Range
Planning, in a thorough federal court analysis, predicted that docket growth
would require 2,300 active appeals and trial court judges by 2010, and 4,070
by 2020. 15 The bench's magnitude will continue to increase, partly because
Congress will not shrink criminal or civil jurisdiction, 16 although the size of the
judiciary remains controversial. 17 The Long Range Planning Committee also
ascertained that the period of time that Chief Executives and Senates needed to
fill openings had significantly lengthened; most delay occurred between the
time that a seat became empty and the time that the president forwarded a
nominee. 18 From 1980 until 1995, nominations-on average-consumed a
12
See MILLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a
National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268-70 (1996) (discussing
effects of expanding appellate dockets and passing statutes in late twentieth century). See
generally Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 23-24 (explaining "steadily expanding jurisdiction" of federal
courts).
13
MILLER REPORT, supra note I, at 3; see also Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1370114223 (1995)) (federalizing criminal acts); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)) (authorizing federal
civil actions). See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44
DEPAUL L. REv. 719, 722-24 (1995) (noting "nearly continuous passage of statutes" expanding
role offederal courts); Tobias, supra note 12, at 1268-70 (analyzing trend offederalization).
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000); id. § 133.
15
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 16 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Long Range Planning Committee
prognosticated that 1,330 judgeships would be necessary by 2000; however, Congress did not
authorize those positions, principally for political reasons.
16
See MILLER REPORT, supra note l, at 3; see also William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273, 277 (1996) (discussing issue of increased caseloads without
increased number of judges).
17
Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (suggesting increase in federal court system), with
Gerald Bard Tjo:'lat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70 (arguing that
expansion of federal court system is not answer).
18
See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 15, at 103; see also infra note 33 and accompanying
text (discussing timing of nominations and confirmations).
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year, and confirmations required three months; the period needed for each
seemed to grow with time. 19 A valuable study by the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC"), which is the federal courts' research arm, determined that vacancy
rates between 1970 and 1992 almost doubled in the federal districts and were
more than twice as high for the appellate courts. 20
The persistent conundrum has created a substantial number of
disadvantages. For example, the problem has slowed trial court resolution and
limited the prompt, economical, and fair disposition of appeals. It has also
imposed unwarranted pressures on the appellate and district court bench, as
well as presented difficulties for attorneys and litigants who must compete for
scarce judicial resources. 21 Moreover, in the twenty-two years following 1970,
open positions had a statistically significant impact on both appeals and trial
court judges, who experienced average workload increases of nine and ten
percent respectively. 22
Politics has pervaded federal judicial appointments since the United States
was founded. 23 Nonetheless, some observers of the selection process contend
that politicization has escalated over the last three and a half decades,
beginning in the Republican Administration of President Richard Nixon, who
secured election with a promise to reattain "law and order" by placing on the
federal bench conservative jurists who would be "strict constructionists."24
However, a rather modern strain originated when the Senate rejected District
of Columbia Circuit Judge Robert Bork, whom President Ronald Reagan had
nominated for the Supreme Court in 1987.

C. The Current Dilemma
Political factors seem more relevant to the present complication than to
the permanent one, but politics apparently infuse each, thus obscuring their
precise relationship. The existing difficulty, therefore, warrants considerable
assessment, even though temporal proximity frustrates comprehension of
19

See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 15, at 3-4.
See Bermant et al., supra note l, at 323; see also 28 U.S.C. § 620-629 (1994)
(authorizing FJC as federal courts' research arm); William W Schwarzer, The Federal Judicial
Center and the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1129,
1130 (1995) (examining role of FJC); infra note 22 and accompanying text (evaluating
20

additional results ofFJC study).
21
See Vacancy Problem, supra note 2, at 374; see also infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text (noting problems arising from judicial vacancies).
22
See Bermant et al., supra note l, at 327; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text
(discussing FJC study).
23
See supra Part II.B. l (discussing presence of politics that has influenced nominations
and confirmations since time of Founders); see also GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 28 (same);
GOLDMAN, supra note 4, at 5-9 (same).
24
See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 20 (1988); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M.
Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny ofLower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 274
(1997).
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exactly what has happened.
1. General Survey of the Current Dilemma

Over the last two decades, distrust, partisan infighting, and divisiveness
that implicated the Democratic and Republican political parties have frequently
accompanied the judicial selection process. Across nearly this entire time,
selection proceeded in a context of divided government, with one major
political party controlling the Executive Branch, which has nomination and
appointment powers, and the other party commanding a Senate majority,
which must provide advice and consent for confirmation of nominees whom
the president tenders.
Several reasons explain why greater controversy has attended judicial
selection for the regional circuits. First, there have been few United States
Supreme Court openings in the last dozen years and those vacancies that did
occur have not been sharply disputed. After the tumultuous appointment of
Justice Clarence Thomas, 25 Chief Executives have nominated, and the upper
chamber has confirmed, individuals who appeared to possess moderate
political views. Second, filling district court positions has traditionally been,
and essentially remains, the prerogative of Senate members who represent the
areas in which openings arise. Notions related to senatorial courtesy and
respect-and the idea that trial court seats are perhaps the only twenty-first
century vestige of unadulterated political patronage-mean these vacancies are
rarely controversial. Third, within their geographic domains, the regional
circuits are increasingly perceived as the courts of last resort to resolve
significant public policy questions-such as issues that involve discrimination
and religious freedom-partly because the Supreme Court entertains a
minuscule, and dwindling, number of appeals. 26
I do not mean to intimate that selection has progressively deteriorated
since 1987 or to level substantial criticism at those who have been responsible
for judicial appointments. There have been certain times when the appellate
courts process functioned quite well. For instance, President George H. W.
Bush and Democratic and GOP senators seemed to cooperate after the
25
See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 6 (1994); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES, at xiv (1992);
see also infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of nominees, including
Justice Thomas).
26
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1997, at D22 (noting appeals courts as courts of last resort); Obstruction of Justice,
NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1997, at 9 (criticizing "partisan opposition" to appeals court nominees);
Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 38
(analyzing difficulties with appeals court nominees' approval); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS 80-81, 194-95 (1996) (discussing limited role of Supreme Court). See
generally Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 403-04 (1996) (discussing fifty percent decline in Supreme Court's decisional output from
mid-1980s to mid-1990s).
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confirmation battle that involved Justice Thomas. This development fostered
Justice David Souter's felicitous selection and rather effective lower court
appointments during the early 1990s. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the
Bush Administration, approximately one hundred appeals and district court
judgeships remained vacant. Democrats claimed that the unfilled seats resulted
from the Chief Executive's sporadic nomination of highly-qualified persons
whom they deemed acceptable. 27 Republicans attributed the unoccupied
positions to slowed consideration of Bush nominees by the Senate majority,
who hoped that a Democratic candidate would triumph in the 1992 presidential
election. 28
Even the Clinton Administration experienced some atypical periods in
which appellate court selection proceeded efficaciously. For example,
substantial coordination between the White House and Democratic senatorswho then comprised a majority-led to approval of more than one hundred
nominees during 1994. 29 Sixty judges received appointment four years later,
when the GOP captured the Senate. 30
From the January 1995 date on which Republicans assumed control of the
upper chamber and thereby reinstituted divided government, until the second
Clinton Administration ended, partisan disputes-as well as accusations and
recriminations-plagued judicial selection efforts. Upon President Clinton's
departure from the White House, there were twenty-five openings on the
regional circuits-practically the same number as existed at the time of his first
inauguration. 31 The 2000 elections left Republicans with a razor-thin majority
in the Senate and permitted President George W. Bush to lead a government
27

See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE
282, 296-97 (1993) (analyzing qualifications of Bush judicial nominees); infra notes 34-38, 53
and accompanying text (discussing nomination process). See generally Carl Tobias, More
Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REv. 477 (1991) (finding improvement in Bush
Administration's appointment of women judges).
28
Goldman, supra note 27, at 282-85; see also infra notes 3 I, 58 and accompanying text
(finding continued vacancies due to politicization). See generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking
Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1270--74 (affording brief history of Bush's
judicial nominees).
29
Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995); Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Haus.

L.REv. 137, 145-51 (1995).
30
See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking
Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 267 (1999); Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close
of the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 827, 841-44 (2000); Carl Tobias, Leaving a
Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 315, 325-27 (1999). For numerous reasons
that may explain this development, see infra notes 70--72 and accompanying text (finding

outside pressure to facilitate appointments).
31
See VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2000). See generally Carl Tobias, Dear
President Bush, 67 Mo. L. REv. I, I (2002) (identifying ninety lower federal court vacancies at
Bush's inauguration); Nick Anderson, Democrats Look to Battles After Ashcroft, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2001, at Al4 (citing twenty-six appellate vacancies at beginning of Bush
Administration).
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that was not divided. However, this opportunity proved ephemeral when
Senator James Jeffords, a Republican from Vermont, chose to become an
independent during May 2001, 32 a phenomenon that substantially influenced
the appointments process because it accorded the Democrats control of the
Senate.
2. Specific Assessment of the Current Dilemma

I attempt below to provide an accurate descriptive rendition of the current
dilemma through the actions undertaken, and the viewpoints expressed, by
numerous people and institutions participating in federal judicial selection. The
Subsection canvasses the second Clinton Administration and George W.
Bush's Administration to date, emphasizing the first year of both.
Appointments during 1997 and 2001 in each presidency are recent and
comparatively analogous; they also demonstrate the telling import of divided
government. That focus is appropriate, even though the existing dilemma
appeared to originate earlier, perhaps with the 1987 Senate rejection of Judge
Robert Bork.
Many political factors that accompanied judicial selection contributed
significantly to the present situation. The Chief Executives and the senatorsincluding the Majority Leaders, members and leaders of the Judiciary
Committees, and individual senators-were mainly responsible for numerous
phenomena that constitute the existing difficulty. These public officials-alone
or synergistically--could have resolved or ameliorated a number of
complications, if they exercised the requisite political will.
The time that the Clinton and Bush Administrations needed to conclude
the nomination and confirmation processes were substantial and analogous.
For example, in 1997, nominations on average consumed more than 600 days,
with confirmations requiring a record high of 183 days. 33 Considerable delay
continued between the date that an opening arose and someone received
nomination.

32

See, e.g., Ashcroft: Speed up Judge Approvals, NEWSDAY, Aug. 8, 2001, at Al5
[hereinafter Ashcroft] (citing pressure on Bush Administration to work more quickly); Neil A.
Lewis, Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A16
(asserting Jeffords's action would affect confirmation of judges); David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords
Defects From GOP, Creating Era of 'Tripartisanship', WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A16
(discussing Senate transfer of power); True Bipartisanship, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2001, at A16
(discussing Jeffords' defection).
33
See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also Orrin
G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A15
(asserting that confirmations required 91 days and nominations 618 days); Clearing the Bench,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at 16A (reproducing similar statistics); supra note 19
and accompanying text (affording comparable data between 1980 and 1995).
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(a) Nomination Process
The dearth of 1997 and 2001 confirmations resulted in part from slow
nominee submission. Certain temporal difficulties should be ascribed to both
presidents and to senators or additional political officers who were responsible
for suggesting particular designees whom the Chief Executives might in turn
nominate. During 1997, however, other participants-namely Senator Orrin
Hatch, Republican from Utah, then-chair of the Judiciary Committee, Senator
Trent Lott, Republican from Mississippi, then-Senate Majority Leader, and
Republican senators-delayed processing out of concerns about matters such
as nominees' tendency to practice 'judicial activism." Similarly, in 2001, their
Democratic counterparts-Senators Patrick Leahy from Vermont and Thomas
Daschle from South Dakota-might have not expedited consideration because
Democrats found troubling the political views of some individuals whom
President Bush recommended.
The Chief Executives appeared to have certain responsibility for the few
appointments that were attributable to the slow pace in tendering nominees.
For instance, on January 7, 1997, President Clinton forwarded to the Senate
twenty-two attorneys-a number of whom had received nomination from the
previous Congress, had testified in confirmation hearings, or had secured
favorable Judiciary Committee votes, but some of whom GOP senators
opposed; President Bush did not announce his initial set of nominees, which
omitted a few designees he had earlier considered, until May 2001. 34
Thereafter, each president gradually, albeit rather sporadically, provided
additional names. Both leaders tended to suggest large groups of the nominees
as the Senate approached a recess. 35 Most nominees selected by the two Chief
Executives seemed well qualified, and a number had served on the federal or
state bench. 36 Some appeared to possess moderate political views, several were
affiliated with the party that did not control the White House, and the
34

See Remarks Announcing Nominations for the Federal Judiciary, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 724-25 (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter Remarks]; Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, President Nominates Twenty-Two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7,
1997), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/l 997101/1997-01-07-names-of-twenty-two-forfederal-bench-resubmitted.html (last visited May 18, 2005). They were Representative
Christopher Cox, Republican from California, Peter Keisler, and Judge Carolyn Kuhl. Judge
Kuhl was subsequently nominated. See infra notes 84, 97 and accompanying text (discussing
political opposition to nominees).
35
See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Clinton
Nominates Thirteen to the Federal Bench (July 31, 1997). Bush sent similarly large nominee
packages before 2001 Senate recesses. See Jonathan Ringel, Bush Nominates 18 to Federal
AM.
LAw.
MEDIA,
at
Bench,
http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZG 1CZBYPC (Aug. 3, 2001 ).
36
See Remarks, supra note 34; Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year,
49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996); see also 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Leahy); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary:
Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 258 (1997) (analyzing Clinton nominees).
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predecessors of Presidents Clinton and Bush had named a few as federal
district judges. 37
In fairness, the Chief Executives' proclivity to submit many nominees a
short time before the Senate recessed-and their treatment of nominations in
general-illustrated particular difficulties. Forwarding numerous people at
once, on the eve of a Senate recess, frustrated the Judiciary Committee's
attempts to expedite candidate review. President Clinton had tendered only
eight new nominations by June 1997; Senator Hatch had found unacceptable
some of the January nominees, which enabled him to assert a defensible claim
that the Committee lacked sufficient nominees for effective panel
consideration. 38
Neither administration proffered names for every opening, which would
have permitted them to pressure the Committee and the Senate-although
there was little reason to submit more nominations than Senators Hatch and
Leahy had observed they would process. 39 In some of 1997 and 2001, both
presidents nominated a larger number of attorneys than either panel chair had
said the Committee would scrutinize. Clinton and Bush also were required to
balance speed against meticulous review of nominee ability and character:
those who proved controversial, or were not competent or ethical, might have
undermined administration credibility and could have slowed or jeopardized
future appointments.
The political figures who proposed individuals to the Chief Executives
may have delayed judicial nominations during 1997 and 2001. For example, in
jurisdictions without senators from the president's political party, designating
the public officials from the states who were to recommend lawyers, or
addressing requests that they participate, consumed time. At various junctures
of the Clinton Administration, some Republican Senate members insisted on
being involved and even wanted to suggest nominees. 40 When Bush compiled
37
See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 36, at 258-68 (analyzing Clinton nominees);
Shannon P. Duffy, Clinton Announces Nominees for Eastern District Court, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1 (calling nominees "obvious compromise" with Republicans);
David G. Savage, Bush Picks 11 for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at Al
(identifying Bush nominees and their qualifications). See generally infra notes 65, 106--09, 11215, 132-37 and accompanying text (discussing techniques to secure bipartisan approval).
38
See Hatch, supra note 33; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track: Vacant Federal
Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at Al2 (citing slow nominations by Clinton). Analogous
are President Bush's submission of rather few new nominees by June 2001 and Senator Leahy's
findin~ that some nominees submitted in the May 2001 nominee package were unacceptable.
9
In 1997, Senator Hatch typically conducted a single hearing every month that the 105th
Senate was in session; these hearings typically evaluated one of Clinton's appellate court
nominees and four or five district court nominees. See infra note 47 and accompanying text
(discussing Clinton's nomination process). Senator Leahy followed a comparatively similar
approach throughout much of200l. See Ringel, supra note 35.
40
Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., Aug. 12,
1997, at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1997, § 1, at 30; see also 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Biden) (suggesting on floor of Senate that Republican senators appeared to have so
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his first appeals court slate, limited consultation with the California and
Maryland Democratic senators apparently terminated the candidacies of one
designee in each jurisdiction,41 while the lack of hearings that Republicans
accorded Clinton nominees seemed to foster paybacks by Democrats in
Michigan, North Carolina, and Ohio. 42
The Clinton and Bush Administrations might well deserve considerable
responsibility for slow transmittal. 43 Insofar as both could have encouraged
senators and other political officers to speed their recommendations for the
respective presidents, executive branch staff might have undertaken additional
efforts. Perhaps each new administration was frustrated by the "start-up"
expense of creating an administration. Helpful illustrations are the time each
president consumed when assembling a Justice Department.
Clinton and Bush thus discharged their nomination obligations rather
similarly in 1997 and 2001. Of course, the administrations did not rely on
identical practices, but the distinctions were matters of degree. The two Chief
Executives could also have foreseen or preemptively addressed certain
problems by gleaning lessons from previous selection endeavors, although
some difficulties might well inhere in the process.
(b) ABA Committee

Over the first and second sessions of the 104th Congress, the American
Bar Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, which has
rated candidates' qualifications-vis-a-vis intelligence, temperament, integrity,
diligence, collegiality, and independence-since the mid-twentieth century,
continued to provide a service considered helpful by numerous observers of
judicial appointments. 44 Nonetheless, Senator Hatch evinced growing concern
intimated). See generally infra notes 58, 122 and accompanying text (referring to role of
opposing political party in nominations).
41
For California, see Jean 0. Pasco & Henry Weinstein, Cox Gives up Shot at Judgeship,
L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2001, at Al3; Savage, supra note 37; Henry Weinstein & Faye Fiore, Rep.
Cox Called Likely Judicial Nominee, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2001, at Al. For Maryland, see David
L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN, May 10, 2001, at IA;
Lewis, supra note 32. See generally infra notes 96, 110, 133-36 and accompanying text
(discussing major role of senators in judicial nominations and confirmations effecting their
state).
42
For Michigan and North Carolina, see sources cited supra notes 8-9. For Ohio, see Tom
Brune, Roadblocks to Justice-Judgeships Unfilled as Congress Wrangles over Appointees,
NEWSDAY, May 9, 2002, at A46; Jack Torry, Court Nominations: Sitting in Limbo, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2001, at 8A; sources cited infra notes 97, 108.
43
1 rely substantially in this paragraph on Helen Dewar, Confirmation Process Frustrates
President: Clinton Wants Senate GOP to Pick Up Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A2l;
Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. Clinton, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at A6; President's Counsel
Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B22; Savage, supra note 37.
44
For this proposition, as well as the notion that the American Bar Association is overly
political and consumes too much time when it rates nominees, see MILLER REPORT, supra note 1,
at 5--6, 8, l l. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL
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about the organization's participation. During February 1997, he terminated
formal ABA involvement in Judiciary Committee deliberations, although
President Clinton used ABA rankings for his entire second term. 45 On March
22, 2001, the Bush Administration informed the ABA that President Bush
would not seek ABA input before he submitted nominations. 46
(c) Confirmation Process

During 1997 and 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee also bore some
responsibility for delayed appointments in part by failing to investigate, hold
hearings for, and vote on more nominees. Each month of the 105th Congress's
first session and across much of the second Clinton Administration, the panel
ordinarily conducted a hearing in which one appellate nominee and four or five
individuals proposed for district courts testified; however, the Committee did
not invariably follow that schedule, and the Senate had confirmed a mere nine
judges by September 1997.47 President Bush and additional observers similarly
criticized the small number of hearings-in particular hearings related to the
appeals courts-and the few appellate judges confirmed in 2001. 48 Later, the
Judiciary Committee apparently operated better: by spring of 2002, it had
accorded hearings to all nominees for the district courts.
The dearth of judges approved in 1997 might have resulted from deficient
temporal and fiscal resources and from politics. Illustrative were Senator
Hatch's resolution of the ongoing dispute about the extent of ABA

JUDICIARY-WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS (1988) (describing ABA committee's evaluation
process).
45
See Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, 83 A.B.A. J. 32, 32 (1997); N. Lee
Cooper, Standing up to Critical Scrutiny, 83 A.B.A. J. 6, 6 (1997); see also Ashcroft, supra note
32 (assessing Ashcroft's intent to "curtail" ABA involvement); infra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text (discussing ABA's role in judicial selection).
46
See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett,
President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with Utah Law Review). See
generally Laura E. Little, The ABA 's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We
Ready to Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37 (2001). Democrats'
insistence on ABA input led to more delay, but the future influence that the ABA will have is
unclear. See Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 107th Cong. 1304-06 (2002) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings] (opening statement of
Sen. Leahy); Jonathan Groner, ABA Adjusts to Role on Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at
10.
47
See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 742 (1997). Senator Jose.Ph Biden (D-Del.), who served as the
Judiciary Committee chair from 1987 until 1994, asserted that he conducted two hearings each
month in his tenure. See 143 CONG. REc. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
48
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade Blame for Judge
Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9 (discussing fault in debate about vacancies);
Editorial, Judicial Nominations Scorecard, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A22 (analyzing
Leahy's chairmanship of Senate Judiciary Committee).
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involvement, 49 as well as debate among Republican Senate members over the
confirmation duties of the Judiciary panel, its chair, and individual memberswhich ultimately prompted the GOP to maintain the status quo. These matters
consumed time and energy that could have been spent processing judicial
nominees. The relatively few 2001 appointments might also be ascribed to the
commitment of inadequate resources and to politics, 50 even though Senator
Leahy implemented certain special measures which fostered review, namely
extraordinary hearings over the Senate's August recess. 51 Insofar as specific
Democrats delayed the process, their actions could have represented payback
for Clinton nominees whom the legislators believed Republicans had stalled. 52
Moreover, the late May decision of Senator James Jeffords to become an
independent meant that the upper chamber did not completely reorganize until
July, which postponed the efficient operation of judicial selection. 53
In fairness, nominees for Article III circuit and district judgeships, who
will have life tenure and exercise the substantial power of the United States
government, warrant deliberate consideration to guarantee that they are
qualified. Moreover, calibrating the appropriate balance between scrutiny of
the individuals' competence and character and prompt assessment is a task that
is simultaneously complex and subtle. Although Senator Hatch asserted that he
preferred to discharge this obligation with great care, politics as much as
caution seems to explain the few confirmations. 54
Senator Trent Lott and other Republican leaders were also responsible for
49

See supra notes 44-46, infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing ABA

issues).
50

1 rely here on Confirmation Hearings, supra note 46, at 456-58 (statements of Sen.
Leahy and Sen. Hatch); Symposium, The Judicial Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1 (2001); see also Ringel, supra note 35 (discussing political difficulties); Jonathan
Ringel, Picking Judges: The Art of the Deal, THE RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2001, at 1 (discussing
conflicts between president and senators in judicial nominations); William Satire, Battle of the
Blue Slips, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33 (describing politics behind judicial nominations).
51
See Confirmation Hearings, supra note 46, at 163-68, 263-67; Neil A. Lewis,
Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22.
52
See Jess Bravin, Aid Bill Is Stalled by Bid to Force Votes on Judges, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2001, at Al6; Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein ls Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J., May
9, 2001, at A26; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol over Pace ofFilling Judgeships,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A33.
53
See supra note 32 (regarding Jeffords's defection).
54
Hatch faced conflicts in Senate traditions and obligations to Republican senators who
opposed activist judges. He did criticize opposition to some nominees and resist the challenge to
Senate traditions, and the 1997 record resembled some other records in similar periods. See 143
CONG. REc. S2536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); supra note 49 and
accompanying text; see also Ted Gest & Lewis Lord, The GOP's Judicial Freeze-A Fight to
See Who Rules Over the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 23 (citing Hatch's
remark that Clinton's nominations should be respected, but that "judicial activists" are not
qualified); Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Seek Greater Influence in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1997, § l, at 1 (discussing Hatch's dual role in judicial nominations); Novak, supra
note 33 (citing Republican opposition despite Clinton's moderate nominees). But see supra note
50 and accompanying text (assessing large role of politics in confirmation process).
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slowed treatment in 1997. Only nine judges received appointment by
September of that year, although the Judiciary Committee had voted favorably
on numerous candidates. 55 Certain observers think the Democratic Party
leadership behaved similarly during 2001. The press of other important Senate
business and the upper chamber's unanimous consent requirement may explain
some delay in placing approved nominees on the Senate calendar and
according them floor debates and floor votes. However, the few judges whom
President Clinton was able to confirm in 1997, particularly as contrasted with
earlier periods, suggest that considerable responsibility could be assigned the
Republican leaders and their scheduling of floor votes. At the 105th
Congress's outset, Senator Lott pledged that he would assiduously evaluate
persons whom the president tendered. 56 During the spring of 1997, Senator
Leahy-who then served as the ranking minority member on the Senate
Judiciary Committee-and additional Democratic senators responded by
explaining how they had facilitated judicial selection in Republican
presidencies and by urging floor debate and votes on nominees. 57
(d) Nomination and Confirmation

During 1997 and 2001, executive branch staff and Senate employees who
had important responsibilities for judicial appointments may have not
appreciated the problem's gravity, as witnessed in the uneven pace of
nominations and of Judiciary Committee analysis. Numerous observers
asserted that the difficulty and considerable delay were animated by politics
and by concerns about the ideological perspectives of specific judicial
nominees. For instance, during 1997, Democratic Senators Joseph Biden from
Delaware, and Paul Sarbanes from Maryland, claimed that their Republican
colleagues were politicizing selection and modifying over 200 years of
tradition. 58

55

This dynamic closely resembled Republican consideration of nominees during the 1996
election year. See 143 CONG. REc. S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
Hatch, supra note 33; see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 36, at 257 (recounting the 1996
treatment); Tobias, supra note 47, at 744-45 (same).
56
See Lewis, supra note 40. See generally Gest & Lord, supra note 54 (blaming Senate for
vacancies); Novak, supra note 33 (assessing Senate's role in continued vacancies).
57
They urged that all judicial nominees have floor votes. See 143 CONG. REc. S2538-41
(1997) (statements of Sen. Biden and Sen. Sarbanes). When Senator Lott threatened to delay
processing, Leahy recounted nominees, with bipartisan support and unanimous panel votes, to
courts under pressure. 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
58
See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (1997) (statements of Sen. Biden and Sen. Sarbanes).
Biden even said that the Republicans were attempting to prevent Clinton appellate court
appointments. See 143 CONG. REc. S2538 (1997) (statement of Sen. Biden). Other observers
proffered similar ideas. Professor Sheldon Goldman said "a newly elected president has [never]
faced this kind of challenge to his judicial nominations," while Professor Geoffrey Stone found
the GOP actions "irresponsible." Gest & Lord, supra note 54, at 24.
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One action-which some thought was political and that related to the
current dilemma and the slow pace of nominee consideration-was the
investigation that Republican Senator Charles Grassley undertook when
assessing how the regional circuits employ and allocate resources. 59 The
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
which Grassley chaired, sponsored hearings to determine if the appellate
system as a whole-and particular tribunals-actually required additions to
their judicial complements, or whether they even required their existing
judgeships. 60 After the panel had conducted those sessions and assembled
considerable relevant information on the regional circuits, the subcommittee
issued a report that found few appeals courts need new judges and that specific
tribunals should have no additional seats until the regional circuits
implemented measures that would enable them to operate in ways that the
subcommittee deemed more efficient. 61 Proper resource deployment is
obviously a legitimate congressional concern, but this project may have
delayed appointments to the appellate courts, which have encountered large
percentages of openings, many judicial emergencies, and significant caseload
growth. 62 Moreover, senators and representatives have not approved circuit
positions for fifteen years, even though the Judicial Conference has proposed
authorization of numerous seats-a suggestion premised on expert,
conservative estimates and carefully gathered empirical data involving dockets
and workloads. 63
59
1 rely substantially in this paragraph on CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON
THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
(1999) [hereinafter GRASSLEY REPORT], and the hearings that Grassley conducted, for example,
Considering Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm.
on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. 893 (1998) [hereinafter Grassley Hearings J];
see also Tobias, supra note 4 7, at 752-53 (discussing prospect of increasing number of judges).
See generally infra notes 141--42 and accompanying text (discussing dispute over whether more
judicial seats are needed).
60
See Grossley Hearings I, supra note 59; Considering Judicial Resources: Considering
the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. 165
(1997) [hereinafter Grossley Hearings II]. See generally infra notes 141-52 and accompanying
text (discussing structural changes in circuit courts).
61
For example, the subcommittee found that the Sixth Circuit should have no new judges
until the court "takes alternative approaches to manage its caseload efficiently" through
"channeling more work to staff counsel and by granting oral argument only [if] truly necessary."
GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 59, at Il(f)(E) (offering additional view that some judges opposed
more positions); Tobias, supra note 47, at 749 (finding that majorities on few courts opposed
more positions).
62
Twenty-seven seats were open. See Judicial Boxscore, THIRD BRANCH, July 1997, at 8.
For data on docket growth, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 15, at 10; POSNER, supra note 26,
at 58-64.
63
See S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1997) (affordingjudgeships bill); S. 920, 108th Cong. (2003)
(same); 143 CONG. REc. S2540 (1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (claiming that Conference
showed need to fill vacancies and for more judgeships but that GOP urged reducing number of
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Similar developments attended judicial selection throughout 2001. For
example, only three of the eleven appeals court nominees forwarded by
President Bush during May received confirmation over the year. 64 Senator
Leahy and other Democrats, such as Senator Charles Schumer, Democrat from
New York, announced publicly that the chamber would accord prompt
approval to individuals who were capable and who possessed relatively
moderate political views. 65 For instance, Judge Roger Gregory and Judge
Barrington Parker, whom President Clinton had named earlier, received
smooth confirmation. 66
The behavior of senators whose political party did not occupy the White
House supports the notion that the existing complication and the delayed
assessment of judicial nominees is motivated by politics, especially concerns
about the nominees' perceived ideological viewpoints. The many appellate
vacancies illustrate the significance of politics. Senators find these vacancies
more critical than empty seats on the districts, because the shrinking Supreme
Court docket and the application of appeals court decisions across states mean
the regional circuits increasingly function as courts of last resort for those
areas. 67
(e) Prospects for Change

To the extent that specific political factors that accompanied judicial
appointments during 1997 and 2001 and underlie the contemporary problem
are inherent in the process, they might resist treatment. For example, the
analysis of persistent openings suggested that approaches that enhance
resources and increase efficiency will only limit delay that does not result from
politics. However, the assessment of political factors that explain the current
difficulty indicated that public officers could address the situation, if they
judgeships); Tobias, supra note 47, at 753 (assessing proposals and their basis); see also Letter
from L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Sen. Patrick Leahy (May
28, 2002) (urging expeditious action on Judicial Conference proposals).
64
See Jonathan Groner, Privilege Fight Looms over Estrada, LEGAL TIMES, June 3, 2002,
at l; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at
A22; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Bush's nominees). But see infra
notes 66, 99-101 and accompanying text (recounting smooth confirmations and ideas to resolve
impasse).
65
See Neil A. Lewis, More Battles Loom over Bush's Nominees for Judgeships, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 1, at 24; sources cited supra note 48 (recounting impasse in Senate); see
also i"/t.a notes 89-90 and accompanying text (citing examples of bipartisanship).
6
Mark Hamblett, Parker Brings Experience and Intellect to Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25,
2001, at l; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2001, at A29; Editorial, Unappealing Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2002, at Al8.
Clinton accorded Judge Gregory a recess appointment to the Fourth Circuit. Alison Mitchell,
Senators Confirm 3 Judges, Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at Al6.
67
See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing role of appellate courts); see also
supra notes 25, 27-32 and accompanying text (recounting nomination procedures of Clinton and
Bush Administrations).
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exercised sufficient political will. Indeed, politics alone appeared to preclude
both the Clinton and Bush Administrations from expeditiously tendering
additional nominees who held centrist political viewpoints and a Senate
majority from swiftly approving those individuals.
(/) Effects ofthe Current Impasse

The existing dilemma has fostered numerous complications, a number of
which resemble those that the longstanding conundrum promotes. 68 For
instance, the modem problem has pressured circuit and district judges, and
parties and counsel-effects manifested by phenomena such as increasing
appellate and trial court dockets and workloads. Escalating federal criminal
prosecutions, many of which are quite complex, mean that some district judges
try few civil matters, numerous district courts experience substantial civil
backlogs, and people and institutions must wait years for trials. 69 Moreover,
burgeoning appeals and empty seats in 1997 required that the Ninth Circuit
cancel six hundred oral arguments, while an analogous situation compelled the
Sixth Circuit to postpone sixty arguments. 70 During that summer, the imminent
crisis fueled by significant numbers of vacancies and the difficulties-namely
slowed civil trials and criminal docket increases that stemmed from delayed
confirmation-led major national bar associations to publish an open letter
urging that President Clinton and Senator Lott accelerate judicial selection. 71
At the end of 1997 and 2001, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist remonstrated
each White House and Senate, which opposing political parties controlled, to
expedite appointments with almost identical strong language. 72 Insofar as
citizens believe the present complication reflects political machinations, these
activities may undermine respect for the federal government, in particular for
Chief Executives and senators, but perhaps for the Third Branch.
68
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (assessing delays for litigants and
increased workloads for courts); see also infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (same).
69
See Gest & Lord, supra note 54, at 24; see also Robert Schmidt, The Costs of Judicial
Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6 (evaluating significant backlogs of civil cases and
disadvantages that those backlogs impose).
70
See Novak, supra note 33, at 37; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice on
Hold, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also id. (documenting Sixth Circuit
cancellations); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE
RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at I (documenting the Ninth Circuit cancellations).
71
See Letter from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et al., to William J. Clinton, President,
& Trent Lott, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (July 14, 1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8046
(1997).
72
See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1998, at l; Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End
Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2002, at I. Similar ideas are in Editorial,
supra note 48, and in a recent ABA resolution. See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., More and FasterNow, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2003, at 8; Jonathan Groner, ABA: Speed up Judicial Nomination Process,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 14, 2002, at 4.
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In sum, the foregoing examination of the permanent vacancies problem
and the current difficulty shows that those constituents-alone and togetherimpeded judicial selection and, therefore, eroded the criminal and civil justice
that the federal appeals courts have been able to deliver since the late 1980s,
particularly the last seven years. The next segment evaluates how President
George W. Bush chose nominees and senators approved judges for the regional
circuits since the initial year of his administration concluded.
II. APPEALS COURT SELECTION SINCE 2002
There are several reasons why the recent nomination and confirmation of
federal appellate court judges is important. First, those circuit appointments are
most immediate. Moreover, neither the president nor Senate members may
persuasively assert that lack of experience with the selection process was
responsible for the complications which the White House and the upper
chamber encountered. Third, the appointment process over that time resembled
the processes for choosing judges that prevailed in 1997 and 2001. Judicial
selection witnessed the same divisiveness, polarization, and bickering between
Democratic and Republican senators as well as Democrats and administration
officials. Indeed, these phenomena, which were Section I's focus, continuedand might have been exacerbated--during the latest period.
Since January 2002, a few specific dimensions of the process for
nominating federal appeals and trial court judges seemed to have improved,
even as numerous features remained almost identical, and certain ones may
have deteriorated. For example, President Bush steadily tendered large
numbers of district court nominees; most individuals appeared to be
competent, ethical, and rather politically moderate. 73 The submissions' pace as
well as the abilities, integrity and ideological perspectives of the nominees
seemed to facilitate Senate consideration. 74
By contrast, the state of the appellate court nomination process apparently
declined. For instance, throughout 2002, President Bush sent to the Senate the
names of only three new nominees. The whole year, the president proposed no
nominees for nine circuit vacancies, five of which had existed since the
administration's beginning. 75
Throughout this time, the ABA continued to analyze and to rate the
qualifications possessed by those individuals whom President Bush
73

See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing Bush's moderate
nominations).
74
See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing Bush's moderate
nominations).
75
See supra notes 34, 39 and accompanying text (citing moderate nominees and efficient
committee hearings). But see infra note 91 and accompanying text (recounting Bush's slow
nominations). The administration could have concluded that it was fruitless and therefore a
waste of scarce resources to recommend more individuals when so many nominations were
pending before the Senate.
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forwarded. 76 The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary assigned
most people strong rankings; it seemed to discharge its traditional
responsibility in an expert, prompt, and careful manner, which may have
rebutted contentions that the group's assessments and ratings are overly
political and consume substantial temporal and economic resources. 77 Despite
these ABA endeavors, the administration has not reconsidered the president's
March 2001 decision to terminate early ABA involvement, a judgment that
apparently fostered delay because Democratic senators required the
organization's participation prior to Senate Judiciary Committee votes on
candidates. 78
The process of confirming nominees appeared better in several ways, was
analogous for others, and was worse in a few. For example, the Judiciary
Committee conducted hearings on each attorney whom the White House had
recommended for district court positions during spring 2002 and remained
current almost the entire year; in 2002, the panel held twice the number of
sessions for appeals court nominees by the August recess as the Committee
had provided throughout 2001. 79 Appellate consideration improved, mainly
because ten nominees testified in February, April, May, June, and September,
although only a single nominee appeared at each hearing in many other
months, and no nominee testified at the October hearings. 80 Moreover, four
members of the Bush Administration's first appeals court package-whose
names President Bush had submitted on May 9, 2001-never received
hearings; the Senate took no final action respecting many Sixth Circuit
nominees and two nominees for the District of Columbia Circuit. 81 The
Judiciary Committee also failed to conduct hearings on many nominees for
numerous Michigan Sixth Circuit vacancies in either 2001 or 2002, even
though the president had recommended three candidates during the initial year

61 rely mainly in this paragraph on Groner, supra note 46, at 10; see also Ashcroft, supra
note 32 (stating intent of Bush Administration to stop ABA involvement because ABA was not
impartial); Jonathan Groner, Judge Fight Within ABA, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at 1 (same).
See generally supra notes 44--46 and accompanying text (referring to ABA involvement and
Republican opposition to process).
77
See supra note 44 (referring to ABA as overly political); see also supra note 76 and
accompanying text (showing usefulness of ABA rankings).
78
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (regarding Bush's elimination of ABA
review); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (regarding Hatch's opposition to ABA
contribution).
79
See supra note 48 and accompanying text (observing slow progress in 2001 and increase
in 2002); see also supra notes 34, 53, 73 and accompanying text (discussing nominees and
reasons for delay).
80
See United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nominations Hearings, at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations_hearings.cfm (last visited May 18, 2005) [hereinafter
Nominations] (listing nomination hearings for 2002 to the United States Court of Appeals). See
generally supra notes 39, 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing Judiciary Committee
operation).
81
See supra notes 34, 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing nominees and smooth
confirmations).
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and another prospect the subsequent June. 82
In 2002, little delay in the confirmation process could fairly be attributed
to the Senate Majority Leader. Senator Tom Daschle expeditiously scheduled
Senate floor votes and debates, when warranted, for many district and a
number of appellate court nominees after he learned that the Judiciary
Committee had granted approval, and the entire chamber promptly confirmed
the nominees. 83
Quite a few candidates to whom the Judiciary panel did not give hearings
were nominated to appeals court positions for which the Republican Senate
had never seriously assessed Clinton Administration candidates. Thus, payback
may explain Senate inaction with respect to GOP appellate nominees. Helpful
illustrations are two Michigan judgeships and one Ohio seat on the Sixth
Circuit, two North Carolina Fourth Circuit openings, and a pair of vacancies on
the D.C. Circuit. The circumstances in Michigan and North Carolina are
particularly illuminating. In the Clinton Administration, Republican senators
required that Judge Helene White, whom President Clinton nominated for an
empty Michigan seat, wait more time than any nominee in United States
history for a hearing-which the Judiciary Committee failed to afford. Further,
the Senate did not vote on four nominees whom Clinton suggested for the
North Carolina appeals court positions. 84 For their part, Democrats granted no
hearings to some of the individuals nominated by President Bush for these
seven openings and other vacancies, because the nominees engendered
substantial controversy, which often implicated their political views. This was
true of nominees from Ohio, as well as candidates proffered for the Fourth,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits, all of whom sparked vociferous and
frequently effective opposition from interest and advocacy groups. 85
Appellate court selection was also marked by charges, recriminations, and
bitter partisan disputes. These phenomena were most palpable when senators
analyzed controversial nominees. For instance, the Judiciary Committee
rejected the appointment of Judges Owen and Pickering to the Fifth Circuit on
ten to nine party-line votes after exceptionally contentious hearings and much
82

See
Vacancy
List
Archives
[hereinafter
Vacancies],
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives.cfm (last visited May 18, 2005) (listing vacant
judicial seats in 2001 and 2002); see also Nominations, supra note 80 (observing that in April,
Committee did conduct hearings for Sixth Circuit nominee Julia Gibbons). See generally Byron
York, Much More Democratic Obstruction, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 20, 2003, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york032003.asp (discussing senatorial blocking of
numerous Sixth Circuit nominees).
83
Nominations, supra note 80. See generally supra note 55 and accompanying text
(referring to stall tactics by minority party).
84
For Michigan, see sources cited supra notes 8, 82. For North Carolina, see sources cited
supra note 9. A total of nine individuals whom President Clinton nominated for the seven
appellate openings never received hearings.
85
The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit nominees were Judges Terrence Boyle, Carolyn
Kuhl, and John Roberts. Jonathan Groner, Placing Bets on Bush Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 13,
2002, at l; Savage, supra note 37.
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spirited interchange, even though the entire Senate might have confirmed both
jurists. 86 When the Committee decided against sending Owen's name to the
chamber floor, President Bush remarked that this action was "bad for the
country [and] the bench" and that he did not "appreciate it one bit, and neither
do the American people"; President Bush accorded Pickering a recess
appointment in 2004. 87 The Committee treated Third Circuit nominee District
Judge D. Brooks Smith in a somewhat analogous manner; however, the
Committee ultimately approved him by a twelve to seven margin, and the
whole Senate confirmed the jurist in a sixty-four to thirty-five vote. 88
Democratic senators reiterated earlier public statements that the chamber
would expeditiously approve nominees whom its members believed possessed
strong qualifications and moderate ideological viewpoints, and the lawmakers
honored this pledge over 2002 and 2003. 89 For example, Circuit Judges Carlos
Bea, Richard Clifton, Allyson Duncan, Julia Gibbons, Jeffrey Howard,
Terrence O'Brien, and Reena Raggi easily secured confirmation. 90
Notwithstanding the significant efforts that both the Democratically
controlled Senate and the Bush Administration devoted to appeals court
selection, the appellate appointments process apparently improved little
throughout 2002. At the conclusion of the 107th Congress and of the
President's initial two years, the regional circuits were left with almost the
identical number of openings as they had experienced before the beginning of
the 107th Congress and the Bush Administration.
When the 108th Congress assembled and organized shortly after the new
year began, the Republican Party commanded a narrow fifty-one to forty-nine
86

Albert R. Hunt, The Politics of Lifetime Appointments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at
Al9; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle over Court Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2002, at Al; see also Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts
on the Politics of Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 695,
716 (2003); Neil A. Lewis, On 2nd Try, U.S. Court Nominee Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2003, at Al4; Byron York, Bored by Estrada? Owen May Prove to Be a Reprise, THE HILL,
Mar. 19, 2003, at 43; infra notes 91, 133 (discussing some controversial nominees, but generally
cooperative confirmations).
87
See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Bush Defies Democrats in Senate, Installs Judge, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 17, 2004, at l. William Pryor was also recess appointed. Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate a
Second Time, Bush Seats Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at Al; see also Helen Dewar,
Senate Panel Rejects Bush Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al (discussing
committee rejection of Owen); Charles Hurt, Senate Panel OKs Owen for Judgeship, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at A6 (discussing eventual approval of Owen after political composition
of Committee shifted).
88
148 CONG. REC. S765l (2002); Audrey Hudson, Senate Confirms Nominee to Court,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. l, 2002, at A3; see also Neil A. Lewis, Panel Approves Bush Appeals Court
Pick, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2002, at Al9; infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing
Smith nomination); Jack Newfield, The Right's Judicial Juggernaut, NATION, Oct. 7, 2002, at
11.
89
See Nominations, supra note 80; supra notes 65--Q6 and accompanying text (citing
examples of bipartisan cooperation in confirmation of moderate, qualified judges).
90
See Nominations, supra note 80; infra notes 96, 106, 108 and accompanying text
(affording examples).
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majority in the upper chamber. On January 7, 2003, President Bush
renominated the individuals whom he had tendered for appellate court
vacancies during his first half-term in office. He did not submit new people for
certain other empty positions, although by March, only seven of these circuit
judgeships lacked nominees. 91 The appeals court selection process remained
highly partisan and sharply contested, even as Republicans instituted numerous
modifications meant to facilitate this dimension of appointments. For example,
Senator Hatch, who reassumed responsibility for chairing the Judiciary
Committee after a one-and-a-half year hiatus, quickly scheduled multiple
hearings for appellate court nominees, while Tennessee Senator Bill Frist, the
new Majority Leader, implemented measures that would expedite Senate floor
debate and votes. Indeed, the alacrity with which the Committee chair noticed
and conducted sessions elicited vehement objections from Democratic
Committee members, who claimed that they lacked sufficient time to
investigate the qualifications of the nominees. Illustrative was Hatch's late
January determination that he would rely upon a single hearing for three
controversial appeals court nominees whom the 107th Senate had given little
serious examination; this announcement sparked adamant Democratic protests
and culminated in a marathon ten-hour question and answer session during
which nominees were questioned. 92 The panel concomitantly granted hearings
and committee votes to quite a few other nominees whom the 107th Senate had
failed to confirm. 93 Nonetheless, a Democratic filibuster, which blocked
Miguel Estrada's approval for the District of Columbia Circuit, delayed
somewhat Senate floor debate and votes. The controversy that surrounded
Estrada's nomination to the District of Columbia Circuit, which enjoys a
reputation as the nation's second most important tribunal because of the crucial
questions that it resolves, ultimately proceeded throughout the summer of
2003. The dispute's blend of judicial politics, selection norms, Senate
traditions, and race, as well as high stakes-which implicated both the District
of Columbia Circuit, whose active membership included equal numbers of
Democratic and Republican appointees, and a possible Supreme Court

91
Jonathan Groner, Judiciary Battle Starts Anew, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at 10; see
also Vacancies, supra note 82. After the GOP had recaptured the Senate during 2002, the
Democrats, in an apparent goodwill gesture, confirmed Fourth and Tenth Circuit Judges Dennis
Shedd and Michael McConnell, who were quite controversial. See Richard Simon, Senate OKs
Long-Delayed Appeals Court Nomination, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A22.
92
See Helen Dewar, Republicans Push Speedy Action on Court Picks, WASH. POST, Jan.
30, 2003, at A 7; Jonathan Groner, Hatch off to Fast Start on Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003,
at 1; Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Links Judicial Nominees to Thwart Opponents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2003, at A21.
93
Illustrative are Ninth Circuit appointee Jay Bybee and Tenth Circuit appointee Timothy
Tymcovich. See Henry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as 9th Circuit Judge, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2003, at B6; Nominee Approved for Appeals Court, DENVER POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at Bl;
see also infra note 122 and accompanying text (considering relations between Senate,
Committee, and administration that could facilitate filling vacancies).
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opening-complicated and slowed the appeals court confirmation process. 94
Selection in 2004 differed minimally from appointments in 2003,
although the process slowed as traditionally occurs in presidential election
years. Bush continued to nominate, and press for confirmation of, some
individuals Democrats found controversial and, thus, persisted in filibustering,
while the Senate did not agree to cloture on the filibustered nominees.
In sum, both the persistent vacancies dilemma and the current political
problem continued to dilute the justice that the appellate judiciary and specific
appeals courts provide. These difficulties require careful treatment. Thus, Part
III examines many concepts that public officials in the three branches of the
federal government could institute in response to the appointments
complications.
Ill. ANALYSIS OF PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS

A. The Executive Branch and the Senate

The president and all senators, regardless of political party affiliation,
must implement a number of measures to improve various selection
responsibilities. 95 For instance, the Chief Executive, assistants who help him
recruit judges, Senate members, and chamber personnel should undertake to
streamline the appointments obligations that they discharge while meticulously
calibrating assessment of nominee qualifications and character.
The Bush Administration and senators must directly confront-and
institute efforts that will decrease-burgeoning politicization; they must
appreciate that such actions may be highly controversial and difficult to secure.
Executive and legislative branch officers should cooperate, reconcile diverse
perspectives, anticipate conflicts before disputes materialize, and efficaciously
treat differences when they do in fact arise. The officials must also halt or
severely restrict particular actions, such as charging each other with
obstructionism, which seem to reflect gamesmanship and the realization of
immediate political benefit. Insofar as politicization hinders judicial
appointments and creates the impression that government officers are elevating
94

See Helen Dewar, Bush Calls for Limit to Senate Debates, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003,
at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Impasse on Judicial Pick Defies Quick Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2003, at Al6. The ongoing filibusters may have similar effects. See Goldman, supra note 86, at
707-16; Helen Dewar, Nomination of Tex. Judge Is Blocked, WASH. POST, May 2, 2003, at A2;
Lewis, supra note 86; Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President
Bush
Says
Filibuster
Decision
a
"Disgrace"
(Mar.
6,
2003),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306.html.
95
See supra note 3 (explaining constitutional division of powers). The persistent dilemma's
best solution would apparently be the authorization of sufficient new positions to accord the
bench every judge now authorized; this would avoid many theoretical, practical, and legal
difficulties. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 569-70. Other approaches may only limit effectively
irreducible temporal restraints. For an assessment of numerous remedies, a number of which
apply to the regional circuits, see id. at 552-73.
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short-term, partisan advantage over the best interests of the United States and
of the federal courts, the behavior may limit public respect for those who are
involved with selecting judges and even for the Third Branch itself.
The above ideas pertain both to the appellate system generally and to
specific appeals courts. For example, the president must work constructively
with senators throughout all regions. An effective technique on which he
should capitalize is consultation-that is, informally contacting and seeking
the advice of these lawmakers and other Senate leaders prior to official
nomination. Express consultation or analogous interactions with Democratic
Senate members from California, Hawaii, and New York might have prompted
comparatively expeditious appointment for Ninth Circuit Judges Bea and
Clifton and Second Circuit Judges Raggi and Richard Wesley. 96 In contrast,
abbreviated consultation, or undervaluing the notions articulated during
consultation, may have delayed the submission of certain Bush designees and
the confirmation of some norninees. 97 Moreover, choosing a nominee for the
next vacancy on each appellate court provides an excellent opportunity to
solicit this input. Officials who are responsible for choosing candidates and for
shepherding them through the approval process should clearly and thoroughly
communicate before and after the administration tenders its nominations.
All senators who represent jurisdictions that are situated in a particular
regional circuit must cooperate with the president and with one another on
important matters, such as whether Senate members will continue to honor the
traditions that hold that appeals court judges should be residents of the states in
which positions open, and should have chambers in those states. 98 When a seat
becomes empty, senators from the jurisdiction could identify and propose to
the president an extremely well-qualified individual. A related concept is the
identification of acceptable compromise designees for intractable or prolonged
vacancies, namely those which now remain in California and Michigan.
Chamber members might also think about implementing an intrastate merit96

See District Judge Raggi Gets Big Promotion, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 2002, at A12; David
G. Savage, Bush Court Nominee Is Voted Down, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al 7; see also
Politics Hinders Senate Confirmation Process, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, May 12, 2002, at D2
(analyzing Clinton nominations). See generally supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text
(illustrating expedited nominations for moderate judges).
97
Examples of candidates not nominated are Peter Keisler, for the Fourth Circuit, and
Representative Christopher Cox, for the Ninth Circuit. See supra note 42 and accompanying text
(highlighting paybacks for certain circuits due to Clinton nominee treatment); see also infra note
110 and accompanying text (illustrating political role in denial of hearings). The phenomena
described in the text may explain Senate inaction on the Bush Sixth Circuit nominees from
Michigan. See supra notes 8, 82 and accompanying text (citing role of in-state senator
consultation); infra notes 105, 112-13, 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing solutions,
such as trades and ABA scrutiny).
98
Senate opposition to Fourth Circuit nominee Claude Allen shows this. See Letter from
Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.) and Sen. Paul
Sarbanes (D-Md.) (July 17, 2003); Letter from Sen. Mikulski and Sarbanes, to Sen. Orrin Hatch
(R-Utah) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) (July 11, 2003).
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selection group for appellate court openings. Such a group might resemble the
Circuit Judge Nominating Commission fashioned and employed by President
Jimmy Carter, 99 the similar committee that Michigan Democratic Senators
Levin and Stabenow broached in 2001, 100 or the district court panel that the
Chief Executive as well as California Democratic Senate members Dianne
Feinstein and Barbara Boxer have relied upon for the last three years. 101 This
type of entity could facilitate the appeals court appointments process in the two
jurisdictions mentioned immediately above because Republicans have a
narrow fifty-five to forty-four margin in the Senate in the 109th Congress.
Finally, if that prospect and other remedial mechanisms now available do not
cure or temper the appellate selection dilemma, the current administration and
senators must redouble efforts to break impasses that now prevail in these
states and elsewhere. 102
B. The Executive Branch

Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush bear considerable
responsibility for the situation that exists today. 103 The present Chief Executive
has recommended sufficient able, ethical lawyers with moderate ideological
views for the district bench, and the Senate Judiciary Committee can process
these nominees. He must continue nominating more exceptionally qualified
attorneys, in particular to the regional circuits, at a rate that will facilitate
senators' consideration. President Bush might have proceeded with caution
99
See, e.g., LARRY c. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 1-2 (1980) (detailing
Carter's commission); Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the
Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 140 (1987) (highlighting merit
commission activities); see also GOLDMAN, supra note 4, at 238-50, 260--61, 267-68, 270, 274,
290 (analyzing Carter's commission and Reagan's disbanding of it). See generally GERHARDT,
supra note 4, at 9, 119-20, 146-47 (discussing Carter's commission).
100
See Editorial, Empty Chairs on the Bench, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al2;
Carl Levin & Debbie Stabenow, Bipartisanship Can End Judge Stalemate, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al5; see also John Wagner, Panel Would Suggest Nominees, NEWS &
OBSERVER, June 19, 2002, at BS (assessing North Carolina Bar Association recommendation to
create similar North Carolina entity); York, supra note 82 (discussing negotiations for bipartisan
commission).
101
See Carla Marinucci, Feinstein, Boxer Given a Say Over Judges, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27,
2001, at A3; Henry Weinstein, Process ofJudge Selection Set Up, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at
Bl; see also Jason Hoppin, Court Tosses out Suit Against Groups that Vet Judges/or Bush, THE
RECORDER, Apr. 1, 2003, at 1 (noting that suit would have shed light on judicial nomination
process).
102
Less traditional ideas, such as trades, may be indicted. See infra notes 109-15 and
accompanying text (explaining need for Bush Administration and Senate to do more).
103
In early 1997 and 2001, President Clinton and President Bush submitted comparatively
small numbers of nominees, most of whom appeared highly competent and politically moderate;
however, Senator Hatch and Senator Leahy asserted that quite a few nominees were not, in fact,
moderate. See supra notes 34-38, 40--42 and accompanying text (discussing nominations and
views of senators).
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when he first assumed office, because the mistakes committed by nascent
administrations have sometimes eroded credibility, delayed appointments, and
even threatened selection.
The president must examine and institute conciliatory devices. These
techniques could be productive, and officials responsible for identifying
candidates and facilitating appointments can rely on the measures' prior
employment if dependence on less cooperative approaches later becomes
necessary. The Chief Executive should invoke practices that will enhance the
performance of administration duties. For instance, he and his assistants might
compile a list of designees who could fill all present and future appeals court
vacancies. 104 President Bush might also consider revisiting the judgment to
eliminate advance ABA scrutiny, because termination of the organization's
input has delayed the selection process, especially for appellate court seats. 105
A related promising alternative would be the nomination of more lawyers
whom Democrats will deem acceptable. For example, Second Circuit Judge D.
Barrington Parker, whom President Clinton had initially named to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York during 1994,
received prompt Senate approval. 106 Elevation is a profitable mechanism, as
district judges nominated for appeals courts rarely encounter complications
securing appointment. 107 Indeed, President Reagan placed on the district bench
Julia Gibbons, who became the first person the Bush Administration named to
the Sixth Circuit-which currently has two vacant judgeships. 108
The Chief Executive should at least consider forwarding additional

104
President Bush could enhance nomination and confirmation through consultation with
the Committee and with senators and by implementing a merit-selection commission. See supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing merit selection commission).
105
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing abandonment of ABA input).
106
Parker was easily approved because he had been confirmed once, enjoyed Democrats'
support, and had served as a district judge, which informed an analysis of his qualifications.
Parker's promotion resembled President Clinton's elevation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, whom
President Bush's father had named to the bench. See Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate
Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B2; see also supra note 66
and accompanying text (explaining Parker's confirmation).
107
All of the presidents who have served since 1981 have elevated significant numbers of
federal district judges to the appellate courts. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of
Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters
Conservative Trend in Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at Al; Tobias, supra note 47, at 752;
see also supra note 106 (illustrating examples of district court judges' elevation to appellate
courts). But see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to some
appeals court nominees).
108
See James W. Brosnan, Senate Confirms Gibbons 95-0 for Appeals Bench, MEMPHIS
COM. APPEAL, July 30, 2002, at B2; Kathleen Gray, Judges Confirmed to U.S. 6th Circuit Court
Posts, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 10, 2005, at l; Editorial, At Last, a Beginning, CIN. POST, July
31, 2002, at 12A; see also UK Professor Confirmed to Appeals Court, LOUISVILLE COURIER-].,
Nov. 16, 2002, at 3B (discussing John Rogers' confirmation to Sixth Circuit). See generally
supra note 42 (discussing partisan politics hindering Sixth Circuit appointments).
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competent lawyers who are affiliated with the Democratic political party. 109
This notion could be quite effective for appellate courts that have had lengthy
openings, encounter significant caseloads, or include jurisdictions that
normally elect Democrats to statewide public offices. Illustrative are
Maryland-whose Senators apparently stymied nomination of a Bush designee
because the administration had neglected to consult them and because the
candidate had never practiced law in the jurisdiction-and the Sixth Circuit, a
court that today experiences unfilled judgeships and confronts one of the
nation's most substantial dockets. 110 Republican and Democratic infighting
seems to explain the Michigan positions that remain unoccupied on the Sixth
Circuit. 111
For courts with multiple longstanding vacancies and large numbers of
appeals, and upon which the parties cannot reach accord, Bush might think
about "trades," such as enabling Democrats to recommend one third of the
designees. 112 Instructive is the proposal by Senators Levin and Stabenow that
they would support certain individuals whom the Bush Administration has
tapped for Michigan openings if the Judiciary Committee grants hearings to
Clinton nominees from the jurisdiction-a suggestion which the White House
apparently rebuffed when it tendered nominations to fill each vacancy. 113 The
president could also exchange judgeships legislation that authorizes new
appellate and district court positions for Democratic recommendations of some
candidates, thus initiating a bipartisan judiciary; this approach may resolve the
109
See supra notes 37, 66, 105 and accompanying text (suggesting opposition party
appointments).
11
°For Maryland, see Lewis, supra note 32; see also supra notes 41, 98 and accompanying
text (noting Maryland senators' reaction to Bush nominations); Carl Tobias, The Bush
Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, 110, 114
(2001).
111
See The Federal Court Blockade, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 12, 2002, at G2; Jonathan
Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading Heats up as Confirmation Process
AM.
LAW.
MEDIA,
at
Gets
Weighed,
http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZO l 36F2RC (Aug. 31, 2001 );
Senate Nomination Process Needs Repair, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at 8A; see also supra
notes 8, 82 (citing difficulties in Michigan).
112
Senator Biden observed that Republicans had previously broached a similar "informal
agreement" during 1997 but that this proposition contravened two centuries of American
tradition. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (1997); see also sources cited supra note 40
(discussing Republican insistence on being able to suggest nominees during Clinton years). The
notion of "horsetrading" judgeships remains a very controversial concept. See Groner & Ringel,
supra note 111. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 157-63 (discussing wish of senators
to have greater involvement).
113
See Levin & Stabenow, supra note 100; see also sources cited supra notes 8, 82, 100
(citing problems in nominations for Sixth Circuit). North Carolina Senator John Edwards
similarly delayed blocking Judge Terrence Boyle's consideration for the Fourth Circuit until
Edwards could discuss with Bush possible selection of a Clinton nominee. See Matthew Cooper
& Douglas Waller, Bush's Judicial Picks Could Be a Battle Boyle, TIME, May 21, 2001, at 22;
see also supra notes 9, 42 and accompanying text (citing problems in North Carolina
nominations).
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current dilemma. 114 The Chief Executive might even agree with Senators Arlen
Specter, Republican from Pennsylvania and the new Judiciary Chair, and
Leahy on a prearranged number of people whom the chamber would approve
. a spec1'fi1c year. 115
m
If conciliatory endeavors are unsuccessful, President Bush and
administration officials should consider and perhaps implement particular
techniques that seem less cooperative. For instance, the Chief Executive could
use the presidency even more as a bully pulpit to shame or blame the
Democrats for specific conduct, such as the filibusters of several circuit
nominees. He might aggressively force the judicial selection issue by taking
the question to the public or making it a Senate election issue. Analogous
devices might include the submission of lawyers for each current opening or
recess appointments, measures that could pressure the Senate by publicizing or
dramatizing how sustained vacancies can undermine the delivery of appellate
justice. President Clinton's Fourth Circuit recess appointment of Judge Roger
Gregory might well have facilitated his confirmation during the subsequent
administration, but this particular circumstance was quite unusual. Judge
Gregory is the first African American to serve on the Fourth Circuit. No Chief
Executive since President Carter depended on recess appointment for judicial
selection, and significant legal, political, and pragmatic restraints limit the
mechanism's efficacy, as Judges Pickering and Pryor illustrate. 116 The Bush
Administration has deployed, or has threatened to invoke, these and similar
kinds of techniques mainly when leveraging Democratic senators, but the
president has exercised caution, and has evidenced concern about the
maintenance of a dignified appointments process. 117
The above-mentioned propositions implicate the appellate courts as a
group and separately. For example, consultation has often been advantageous
and has seemed to entail little political expense. Insofar as discounting the
advice that Senate members furnished stalled the candidacies of nominees or
designees whom Democrats in various jurisdictions apparently opposed, the
114

See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 36, at 271. President Eisenhower made a similar
proposal in 1960. See id.; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (affording judgeships
bill and Judicial Conference proposals).
115
1 am not recommending that President Bush institute the ideas in this paragraph, but the
president should evaluate them and be pragmatic about approving judges. President Bush might
assess how important openings are and may conclude that filling the federal judiciary is less
important than certain principles, such as appointing the type of jurists he prefers.
ll6for example, when the Senate does not accord judges permanent appointments, what
effect will be assigned the cases in which they participated? See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d
1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1640 (2005); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d
1008, 1009-14 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing legality of recess appointments); Thomas A. Curtis,
Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in
Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1758-59 (1984) (same). See generally
supra note 66 and accompanying text (citing smooth confirmation of Gregory).
117
See Remarks, supra note 34; Lewis, supra note 66; see also sources cited supra note 48
(evidencing blame for vacancies leveled at Democrats).
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Chief Executive may wish to broach future prospects with the elected officials
or to give their ideas more substantial weight. Had the president or
administration employees responsible for selecting judges conferred with
California, Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina Democratic senators
regarding lawyers under White House assessment, the Chief Executive might
have foreseen and even avoided the difficulties that materialized when the
legislators later objected. The president may have at least minimized the
problems. 118
The president should also keep in mind that concerns about the political
viewpoints held by nearly all judicial nominees seemingly delayed assessment
and confirmation. To the extent that nominees' perceived ideological
perspectives triggered interest group opposition, prolonged appointment, and
sometimes fostered rejection, the Chief Executive could forward individuals
who are less doctrinaire or might be more realistic about the significant
influence which the organizations can wield. 119 The president should
concomitantly refrain from employing selection measures that might
perpetuate and even accentuate the deleterious cycle of paybacks. Illustrative
were the Chief Executive's January 2003 decisions to renominate Judges
Owen and Pickering for the Fifth Circuit, despite the fact that the Judiciary
Committee had opposed floor consideration of each jurist on a ten to nine vote
in 2002, and to recess appoint Pickering in 2004. Submitting nominations
twice and using a recess appointment may have encouraged Democrats to
prevent or delay confirmation of these and other nominees by using filibusters.
C. The Senate

All senators must analyze and implement cooperative mechanisms
because the upper chamber also bears responsibility for the existing appellate
vacancies. GOP lawmakers should remember that the Democratic Senate
approved more appeals court judges-notwithstanding how politicized
selection was-when Republicans were Chief Executives. 120 Democrats might
want to keep in mind that the public could hold them accountable for the
difficulties that lengthy openings can impose and that Republicans once again

8

See supra notes 8-9, 41, 75, 81, 84, 96--97, 110-13, infra notes 131-35 and
accompanying text (illustrating party politics hindering nominations).
ll9Neil A. Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled by Refusal to Release Papers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A28; David M. Savage, Despite Own Views, Nominee Would Back
'Roe', L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at Al3; see also Jonathan Groner, Abortion Returns to
Nominations Stage, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002, at 1 ; supra notes 42, 84-86 and accompanying
text (recognizing role of politics in nominations). See generally GERHARDT, supra note 4, at
217-29 (discussing interest group pressure); GOLDMAN, supra note 4, at 310-11 (using Daniel
Manion's nomination as example of purely party opposition).
120
See supra notes 47, 50-51 and accompanying text (referencing low confirmation rates
during Clinton Administration); see also Hartley & Holmes, supra note 24, at 275-77 (same).
ll
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have a Senate majority. 121
Democratic senators, therefore, should depend on conciliatory selection
techniques. These members must be receptive to potential administration
overtures with frank, informative consultation as well as swift approval of each
Clinton district court appointee whom President Bush might decide to
elevate-and of additional nominees who possess rather moderate ideological
perspectives. Moreover, the lawmakers could invoke many specific
cooperative measures. For example, when Democrats think Republican bench
candidates are unacceptable, the legislators might suggest compromise
designees whom they believe preferable. 122 Democratic Senate members may
also want to review carefully the numerous particularized recommendations for
improvement in discrete phases of judicial selection that President Bush
espoused and publicized less than one week before the November 2002
elections. However, a number of specific propositions that President Bush
championed-such as advocating that active circuit and trial judges declare
their intention to assume senior status at earlier junctures and imposing strict
deadlines on particular stages in court appointments, namely Judiciary
Committee hearings and Senate floor debates and votes-appear impractical
and could undermine and even contradict venerated judicial and senatorial
prerogatives and traditions. 123
Insofar as slowed nominee examination has left appellate seats open, the
upper chamber could think about specific mechanisms that will expedite
appeals court appointments. For instance, the Judiciary Committee might
continue to grant hearings and panel votes on more attorneys with the rather
limited evaluation procedures Senator Hatch and the Committee members
seemingly followed in 2003, and the panel may wish to abrogate sessions for
those individuals who prompt no controversy. To the extent Democratic
senators have delayed nominees because of their ideological outlooks,
longstanding norms and some recent practices indicate that people

121
See sources cited supra notes 32, 48, 69-72 (recognizing problems with judicial
vacancies and who is blamed). See generally Newfield, supra note 88, at 11-16 (discussing
problems stemming from role of ideology in confirmation hearings).
122
Washington Senators Slade Gorton, a Republican, and Patty Murray, a Democrat,
agreed to suggest designees in 1997, as have Nevada Senators John Ensign, a Republican, and
Harry Reid, a Democrat, since 2001. See 149 CONG. R.Ec. S3678-S3688 (2003) (statements of
Sen. Ensign, Sen. Hatch, and Sen. Reid); Tony Batt, With Feeling and Fealty, Reid Counsel
Helps Guide Judges Through Senate, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 26, 2001, at 2F; Callaghan,
supra note 40. Senator Frist should reconcile disputes over the process and over nominees, and
he might want to seek assistance from Senators Leahy and Reid.
123
See Mike Allen & Amy Goldstein, Bush Has Plan to Speed Judicial Confirmations,
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2002, at A21; Edwin Chen & Henry Weinstein, Liberals Bracing for
Quick Judicial Action by Bush, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A22. See generally Bermant et al.,
supra note 1, at 333-44 (suggesting solutions to vacancy problem); infra note 125 and
accompanying text (suggesting compromises).
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recommended should have Committee hearings and ballots. 124 Senate Majority
Leader Frist could apply techniques to encourage greater assessment in the full
chamber. For example, he might facilitate votes on larger numbers of nominees
by scheduling floor consideration immediately after he receives notification of
positive Committee action. Insofar as disputes over specific persons may have
fostered delay, Frist should attempt to permit more floor debate and additional
final ballots on the individuals, although Democrats' ongoing use of filibusters
might thwart these efforts. 125
Senate members must calculate the necessity for thorough exploration and
prompt approval of nominees while confirming lawyers with the requisite
ability and the character to render superior federal judicial service. Democrats
could ask whether they now overemphasize ideology, just as Republicans
should have rejected the quixotic attempt to discern whether Clinton
Administration nominees would engage in "judicial activism" once on the
bench. 1·26 Article II language prescribing Senate advice and consent 127
envisions that the chamber members will scrutinize nominees' competence and
ethics as well as the degree to which nominees appreciate and respect
separation of powers; 128 senators should not delay a candidate to evaluate how
124

See supra notes 47, 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing scheduling and ABA
analysis); see also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (showing large groups of nominees
submitted immediately before Senate recess). The 2002 party-line votes against Judges Owen
and Pickering may be paybacks. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing
Owen and Pickering). Now that the panel has sufficient, acceptable names to facilitate
processing, President Bush may warrant less criticism.
125
Democrats premise filibusters on lack of information; however, they might consider a
compromise by, for instance, allowing a floor vote in exchange for nomination of one of
Clinton's nominees. The debate before confirmation of Circuit Judges Merrick Garland, Marsha
Berzon, William Fletcher, and D. Brooks Smith included some candid, healthy exchange. See
143 CONG. REc. S2515-41 (1997); 144 CONG. REC. Sl1872 (1998); sources cited supra note 87;
see also Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays, Senate Confirms 2 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2000, at Al6 (citing similar healthy exchange with Judge Paez); Memorandum of
Understanding on Judicial Nominations, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A9 (agreeing to reduce
filibuster use and to vote on nominees).
126
See generally, The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process: Hearings Before the
Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 107th Cong. 1-4
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 Hearings] (statement of Sen. Schumer). This hearing discusses "the
question of what role ideology should play in the selection and confirmation of judges." Id. at 1
(statement of Sen. Schumer); see also Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact,
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property
Rights, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (discussing necessity of these
hearings to examine "problem of judicial activism"); 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (same); Newfield, supra note 88, at 11-16 (discussing problems
posed b~ emphasis on ideology).
12
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
128
See 2001 Hearings, supra note 126, at 8-9 (statement of Sen. Sessions); see also Albert
Alschuler, Making Ideology an Issue, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2002, at 23 (discussing whether
views should block nominee despite qualifications); Douglas Laycock, Forging Ideological
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A31 (questioning Senate inquiry into legal views of
nominees).
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the lawyer, if appointed, would resolve substantive questions. Probing these
matters may compromise the judiciary's independence. 129
Democrats might also consider approving people whose qualifications
would make them excellent judges, as the GOP often so behaved when
Republicans held a Senate majority and a Democrat occupied the White
House. 13 Certain Democratic senators remain disturbed about the treatment
that the GOP afforded numerous Clinton nominees, while some Republicans
continue to resent Judge Bork's 1987 Senate defeat and the acrimonious
confirmation fight over Justice Thomas, activities that the GOP thinks reflected
opposition to the jurists' decisionmaking. 131 Democrats and Republicans alike
must reject this poisonous dynamic that is characterized by incessant paybacks
and should seriously entertain some global agreement or at least forge a
modicum of consensus. 132
These notions implicate the appellate system and each appeals court. For
instance, Democrats from geographic locales that have experienced deadlocks
could propose compromises or trades. Illustrative of the first suggestion are the
Maryland Senate members, who should recommend a moderate candidate
whom Republicans would deem acceptable to fill a Fourth Circuit vacancy. 133
California furnishes a helpful example of potential trading. 134 Democrats there

°

129

See generally UNCERTAIN JUSTICE POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 1-75, 121-71,
205-42 (2000) (supporting proposition); Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999) (same). Numerous Republicans apparently believe that
Democratic senators' decision to filibuster Miguel Estrada's nomination illustrates these ideas.
See sources cited supra note 93 (discussing Estrada filibuster).
130
See supra notes 47, 76-77 and accompanying text (citing procedures during Clinton
Administration and ABA analysis of qualifications). See generally supra notes 34-38 and
accom~anying text (discussing nominations of moderates).
1 1
See Gest & Lord, supra note 54, at 24; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 36, at 256;
Melone, supra note 5, at 68. See generally MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992)
(recounting Bork's rejection); PAUL SIMON, ADVISE AND CONSENT (1992) (discussing
confirmation of Justice Thomas). Democrats' actions may be distinguishable, as Supreme Court
selection is so critical, and they rarely so assessed lower court nominees. See 143 CONG. REc.
S2538-41 (1997) (statements of Sen. Biden and Sen. Sarbanes). See generally Michael J.
Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 393 (2002) (assessing strategies
during Supreme Court nominations).
132
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes J 11-14, 126 (citing controversies and proposed
solutions); see also supra notes 42, 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing political motives
blocking confirmations or creating delays).
133
See, e.g., supra notes 41, 110 and accompanying text (recognizing problems with
Maryland's situation). But see Mike Allen, Virginian Picked for 4th Circuit Judgeship, WASH.
POST, Apr. 29, 2003, at Bl (citing Bush's nomination of two conservatives to Fourth Circuit).
The 2002 Committee rejection, and 2003 renomination, of Fifth Circuit nominees Owen and
Pickering as well as the 2004 recess appointment of Pickering make that situation too sensitive
for either approach. See supra notes 86-87, 90, 123 and accompanying text (explaining past
problems and benefits of moderate nominees and parties working together).
134
See, e.g., Howard Mintz, Bush Picks Latina for Appeals Court, SAN JOSE MERCURY,
Feb. 14, 2003, at 19A (discussing Ninth Circuit appointment of Consuelo Callahan); Henry
Weinstein, Conservative State Judge Nominated for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003,
at B8 (same); see also 149 CONG. REc. S4604 (2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (naming
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might reduce opposition to a stalled Republican appellate court nominee, if
Bush later forwards a nominee whom they proffered. 135 Analogous
circumstances in the Sixth Circuit could warrant similar measures. For
instance, the Michigan senators might end or temper the stalemate that has
prevented the Republican Administration from naming someone to this
jurisdiction's two unoccupied appeals court seats and that denied both Clinton
nominees thorough Senate examination. 136 Senators Levin and Stabenow have
intimated that they may be willing to support a Bush Administration candidate,
if the White House proposes a Clinton nominee. 137

D. The Judicial Branch
The federal courts are less able than the political branches to improve the
existing situation, because Article II of the Constitution assigns the Chief
Executive and the Senate principal responsibility for selection. Nonetheless,
the judiciary could undertake increased efforts to publicize vacancies and the
grave difficulties that they often create. 138 The Third Branch should also
develop salutary methods for enhancing appointments that the president and
the Senate in turn implement. Members of the bench might also directly ask or
encourage senators to facilitate the process. For example, when Third Circuit
Chief Judge Edward Becker requested that the Senate fill more openings on
that tribunal, his personal advocacy may well have led Senator Biden to favor a
qualified Clinton nominees who never got hearings); Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Distances
Herself from Past Positions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al5 (discussing Bush nominee
Carolyn Kuhl); supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (suggesting that trades would be
beneficial).
135
See supra notes 9, 42, 74, 80, 84-85, 118 and accompanying text (noting partisan
politics in appeals court confirmations); see also infra note 144 and accompanying text
(suggesting fewer judges may be better for circuits). Recent actions may preclude this option in
the near term. See Allen, supra note 133 (relating Bush's continued nominations of
conservatives); Mintz, supra note 134 (noting Democratic opposition to appointments of
conservatives to Ninth Circuit).
136
See supra notes 8, 42, 82, 84, 97, 107, 110--12 and accompanying text (discussing
phenomenon of Senate opposition).
137
My ideas depend on seats being vacant, how the filibusters are resolved, and ongoing
contention. See supra notes 8, 40--42, 81, 84-85, 97-98, 113, 118 and accompanying text (citing
political reasons for continued vacancies). For recent ideas, compare Judicial Nominations,
Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority ls Denied Its Right to Consent, Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights,
108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Sen. Comyn) (discussing abuse of filibusters to block
nominees), with Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Proposes New Confirmation
Process
for
Judicial
Nominations
(Apr.
30,
2003),
at
http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/pr-archives_judiciary .html (last visited
May 18, 2005) (noting problem of extremists and suggesting state commissions).
138
The federal judiciary's institution of these types of efforts could increase public
awareness of, and may galvanize citizen support to rectify or ameliorate, the vacancies problem;
such endeavors might even accentuate the sensitivity of executive and legislative branch officials
to the important need for expeditious judicial appointments.
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controversial nominee. 139 However, this technique has rather limited
application, because some could find the measure overly political or might
believe that it threatens the notion of an independent judiciary. 140
Numerous concepts above implicate the appellate system as a whole, as
well as specific appeals courts. For instance, all judges who are members of
particular regional circuits may want to reconsider whether the active judicial
complements that Congress now authorizes for their courts permit the tribunals
to deliver justice and, if not, exactly how much supplementation is indicated.
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts found that none of the twelve regional circuits required any additional
seats, and a majority of judges who serve on three tribunals have concurred
with this determination. 141 Nevertheless, a study commission, which
lawmakers established in 1997 to analyze and formulate suggestions for
improving the regional circuits, detected that members of significantly more
courts believed their tribunals would function better with larger contingents. 142
The issue of optimal circuit size has provoked sharp disputes and been
quite controversial in the appeals courts, especially among the appellate
bench. 143 For example, then-Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, testified
before the Senate panel eight years ago that the Fourth Circuit worked
effectively with fewer active judicial positions than Congress had
authorized, 144 and Senator Helms invoked similar ideas when he opposed
multiple Clinton nominees for North Carolina vacancies on the appeals
court. 145 However, the members of the Fourth Circuit positively answered in
the highest percentages study commission survey questions that asked whether
139

The controversial Bush nominee for the Third Circuit was District Judge D. Brooks
Smith. See Jonathan Groner, Stars Align for Circuit Nominee, LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 2002, at 1;
see also sources cited supra note 88 (noting Smith's confirmation).
140
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 126-29 (analyzing judiciary independence). See
generally Lauren Robel, Impermeable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence, and the Long Range Plan
for the Federal Courts, 71 IND. L.J. 841, 846-51 (1996) (discussingjudiciary's limited role).
141
See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing hearings on this issue). But
see infra notes 142, 146-47, 150 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of larger
judiciary).
142
See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 18-21 (1998) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; see also COMMISSION
ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 77 (1998)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. Congress authorized the commission in 1997, and the commission
completed its study in 1998. See id. at 1.
143
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17 (discussing opposing views on increase in number
of judges). See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 23-53 (1993) (discussing both
sides of argument).
144
Grassley Hearings II, supra note 60 (discussing hearings).
145
See David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes over a Federal
Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at Al3; see also supra notes 9, 42, 84 and
accompanying text (discussing issues in North Carolina). This conflict did not prevent Senator
Helms from recommending that President Bush nominate Judge Boyle. See Firestone, supra.
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the court's growth would enable the jurists to "correct prejudicial errors,"
"minimize appellate litigation costs," avoid inconsistent decisionrnaking, and
"hear oral argurnent." 146 Moreover, the tiny percentages of oral arguments and
published opinions that the Fourth Circuit produces suggest that the tribunal
might dispense greater justice if the court had a bigger complement or at least
were at full strength. 147
By comparison, then-Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., asserted that the
Sixth Circuit operates well with the tribunal's present contingent but could
function more efficaciously with several additional seats. 148 A majority of
active judges on the court asked lawmakers to create new positions, 149 and
members affirmatively responded in the largest percentages to the commission
queries that asked whether enhancing circuit size would help the tribunal
"avoid a backlog" and "write a statement of reasons for all decisions in
nonfrivolous appeals." 150 With all due respect, the miniscule percentage of
published determinations that the appellate court now furnishes, its
comparatively slow resolution times, and its substantial dependence on visiting
appeals and district court judges to staff panels indicate that the tribunal might
work better if additional seats were authorized. 151 Those members who
currently oppose expansion may wish to reassess whether the appellate court
would operate more effectively using new judgeships. 152
V. CONCLUSION

Protracted federal appeals court vacancies threaten the delivery of
appellate justice in the twenty-first century. The situation comprises a
longstanding difficulty and a present complication, which is essentially
political. President Bush, as well as GOP and Democratic senators, should
institute concerted efforts to depoliticize and expedite the modem judicial
146

See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 142, at 18-19; see also infra notes 147, 150 and
accompanying text (proposing additional judges).
147
See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 142, at 93, tbls. 2, 3; see also infra note 151 and
accompanying text (suggesting greater productivity and efficiency with more judges).
148
Letter from Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Sixth Circuit Chief Judge, to Sen. Charles Grassley,
Chair, Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts (June 19, 1998); see
also supra note 61 and accompanying text (articulating Grassley's views).
149
Some judges did dissent See GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 59, at Il(f); Tobias, supra
note 47, at 749.
15
°wORKING PAPERS, supra note 142, at 18, 21. The conservative estimates on which the
Judicial Conference premises judgeship proposals suggest that the Sixth Circuit needs one new
judgeship. See S. 920, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2003); see also Tobias supra note 47, at 753
(listing considerations for determining if additional seats are needed). But see GRASSLEY
REPORT, supra note 59, at 2-7 (noting "little consensus" on necessity of more judges). In 1999,
the Conference had proposed two new positions. See S. 1145, 106th Cong.§ 2(a)(3) (1999).
151
See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 142, at 93, tbl. 2, 95, tbl. 7, 108, tbl. 6a.
152
These are sharply contested, unresolved issues. See supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text (discussing hearings on this issue). Of course, the authorization of new
judgeships will have little effect, unless and until the process improves.
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selection process. They might discontinue--or at least should Illimm1zecriticism of each other, reconcile partisan disagreements, and solve or
ameliorate the contemporary appointments dilemma. Upper-echelon legal
officials, including Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and White House
Counsel Harriet Miers, the Republican and Democratic Senate leadership, and
Judiciary Committee members could assume responsibility for this endeavor.
The Bush Administration and senators on each side of the aisle have
perpetuated the unproductive dynamics that attended earlier appeals court
selection. For example, the Chief Executive has renominated quite a few
controversial lawyers, the Senate Judiciary Committee may have attempted to
process some nominees more quickly than was advisable, and the Democrats
have stalled floor debates and votes with filibusters. President Bush and
senators from both political parties might want to abandon, or at least should
reconsider, use of these measures, which have proved divisive and which can
halt judicial appointments.
Senate members who represent all states located in particular regional
circuits must enlarge communications there, among themselves and with the
Chief Executive. If senators from every jurisdiction and the president assess
and implement the recommendations above, they should be able to enhance the
federal judicial selection process in these states, their appellate courts, and
perhaps the nation.

